Deposit insurances were blamed for encouraging the excessive risk taking behavior during the 2008 financial crisis. The main reason for this destructive behavior was "moral hazard risk", usually caused by inappropriate insurance policies. While this concept is known and well-studied for ordinary insurance contracts, yet needs to be further studied for insurances on financial positions. In this paper, we set up a simple theoretical framework for a bank that buys an insurance policy to protect its position against market losses. The main objective is to find the optimal insurance contract that does not produce the risk of moral hazard, while keeping the bank's position solvent. In a general setup we observe that an optimal policy is a multi-layer policy. In particular, we obtain a close form solution for the optimal insurance contracts when a bank measures its risk by either Value at Risk or Conditional Value at Risk. We show the optimal solutions for these two case are two-layer policies.
Introduction
An important lesson from the 2008 financial crisis is that an underestimated moral hazard risk can be destructive. Whilst this fact was widely known in insurance, it is rather new for insurances in the banking industry. A moral hazard is a situation when some agents take excessive risk because the costs of taking risk is not felt by them. In other words, a moral hazard occurs since some agents know the potential costs of taking further risk will be borne by other agents and/or the government. Kenneth Arrow (e.g.,Arrow (1971) ) was among the first who discussed the risk of moral hazard as an inevitable risk caused by altering a policyholder's incentives ( see also Heimer (1989) ).
An extensive use of the deposit insurances in the financial sector caused excessive risk taking behavior. In the years prior to the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions, like banks and in particular hedge funds, bought deposit insurances in order to protect their investments. As a result, financial institutions could venture riskier investments, by transferring the big losses to the insurance companies; see Collins (1988) , Kaufman (1988) , Dowd (1996) and Freixas and Rochet (2008) . This was a reason for the huge risk taking behavior which caused big losses in 2008. In a banking system, moral hazard is a result of the absence of enough prudential policies. While, the minimum capital requirement is aimed to partly prevent the excessive risk taking behavior by putting banks' equity at risk, it can also encourage further risk taking behavior; see Hellmann et al. (2000) . After 2008, it is proven that neither these measures nor any other prudential regulatory law can prevent another crisis unless the excessive risk taking behavior is controlled; see Dowd (2009). 1 In order to prevent the risk of moral hazard, regulator needs to insist on the correct regulations. The key is that the financial system must not be used for reckless gambling financial practices, inspired by excessive risk taking behavior. In general, there are two ways to reduce the excessive risk taking behavior. First, introducing ex-ante policies which enforce banks to bear part of any loss they impose to the system, and second, introducing ex-post policies which penalizes the excessively risky behaviors (see similar discussion for market discipline in Freixas and Rochet (2008) ).
In this paper, we have chosen to set an ex-ante policy. In this approach, the risk of moral hazard is reduced by setting contracts that both parties, the insurer and the insuree, feel the losses. We consider a bank that seeks an optimal insurance contract that does not produce any risk of moral hazard, while also keeping the bank's position solvent. To remove the risk of moral hazard we assume the contract is a non-decreasing function of losses. By adopting a complete market model as in Merton (1977) , where the author treated a deposit contract as an option, we will characterize the optimal contracts. Ultimately , we use α-percent Value at Risk and Conditional Value at Risk for the minimum capital requirement 2 , and we see that the optimal policies are two-layer polices whose upper and lower retention levels are 1 It is worth mentioning that moral hazard have been extensively studied in the literature of game theory in particular the principal agent problem, and also recently has received some attention in venture investment studies, which are unrelated to the risk management discussions of the present paper.
2 as recommended in the Basel II accord and Solvency II completely determined. Our work is important from two perspectives: first, we introduce a mathematical framework to design deposit insurances that cannot impose the risk of moral hazard to the financial system. Second, this work uses techniques from actuarial mathematics that is rather new in the problems related to finance and banking and can be further studied in future. This work is in the same line as Assa (2015b) , where risk management under prudential policies is discussed. From technical point of view we use the Marginal Indemnification Function (MIF) technique developed in Assa (2015a) . The problem of insurance and re-insurance design with no risk of moral hazard is very well studied in the literature of actuarial science, for instance one can see , Cai et al. (2008) , Bernard and Tian (2009) , Cheung (2010) , Chi and Tan (2013) , Cheung et al. (2014) and more recently Assa (2015a) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some mathematical notions and introduces a set-up for a bank balance sheet. In Section 3, general optimal solutions are discussed. In Section 4, we will present the solution to the risk management problem for particular cases.
Problem Statement
Let (Ω, P, F) be a completed probability space, where Ω is the set of all scenarios, P is the physical probability measure and F is a σ-field of measurable subsets of Ω. We denote the set of all random variables by L 0 (Ω, F) = L 0 . Furthermore, E denotes the mathematical expectation with respect to P.
In this paper, we assume contracts (policies) are issued at t = 0, the beginning of a year, and liabilities are settled at t = T , the end of the year. Every random variable represents losses for different scenarios at time T . For any X ∈ L 0 , the cumulative distribution function associated with X is denoted by F X . We also denote the market risk free interest rate by a constant number r ≥ 0.
Let us consider a bank with an initial capital 3 e −rT b, and a non-negative loss variable L ≥ 0 at time T . By buying an optimal insurance contract, the bank wants to hedge its global position by transferring part of its losses to an insurance company. If we denote the insurance policy by a non-negative random variable I at time T , it has to satisfy 0 ≤ I ≤ L. The value of the insurance policy is given by a premium function π : D → R at time 0, where D ⊆ L 0 is the domain of π. Therefore, the bank's global loss position is composed of four parts: the initial capital at time 0 i.e., e −rT b ; the global loss i.e., L; the insurance policy i.e., −I; and the premium payed for the insurance policies at time 0, i.e., π (I) (i.e., e rT π (I) at time T ). Therefore, a simplified balance sheet of the bank's position at time T is given as follows
Equity
Liability The bank is solvent if its global position is solvent. To measure the solvency we use a risk measure; for instance, Value at Risk (VaR) or Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR). Recalling that VaR is what is recommended in the Basel II accord for the banking system, and also in the Solvency II for the insurance industry. In this paper, denotes the risk measure recommended by regulator. The bank is solvent if its capital b is adequate for the solvency i.e., e rT π (I) + L − b − I ≤ 0. In other words, the position e rT π (I) + L − b − I does not produces any risk. Therefore, an optimal decision for the bank is to buy the cheapest insurance contract i.e.,
(1)
After setting up the problem, we move one step forward to use a more specific model for the bank's asset. Our paper follows an approach similar to Merton (1977) , by considering a risk-free asset and the bank's asset that follows a geometric Brownian motion. This choice is very crucial, since one can use the risk neutral valuation in order to find the "market (consistent) value" of an insurance contract which is requested by Solvency II. If the asset price dynamics at time t ∈ [0, T ] is denoted by S t then we assume that it follows the following stochastic differential equation:
where W t , µ and σ are respectively a standard Wiener process, drift, and volatility (constant numbers).
It is also known that the solution to this SDE is the geometric Brownian motion given by
We assume that the bank's loss is a non-negative and non-increasing function of its assets value. In mathematical terms, L = L (S T ), where L : R → R + ∪ {0} is a non-increasing function. A natural example is losses due to negative returns
It is clear that L n is equal to max e rT S 0 − x, 0 = − min x, e rT S 0 + e rT S 0 . Let us introduce generalized left and right inverses of a general loss function L as L −1 (y) = inf {x ∈ R|L (x) ≤ y} and L −1 (y) = max {x ≥ 0|L (x) ≥ y}, respectively. It is clear that L (x) ≤ y if and only if x ≥ L −1 (y). Also note that (L n ) −1 (y) = L n (y) = − min y, e rT S 0 + e rT S 0 . Now we introduce a risk measure for bank's solvency that is chosen by regulator. For instance, in Basel II or Solvency II, Value at Risk is recommended to value the minimum capital requirement. The Expected Shortfall (or the Conditional Value at Risk) is another risk measure that is recently considered in industry. But these risk measures are members of a larger family of risk measures called distortion risk measures, introduced below.
Let Π : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a non-decreasing and cádlág function such that Π(0) = 1 − Π(1) = 0. This function induces a probability measure on [0, 1] whose values on the intervals are given by m Π [a, b) = Π (b) − Π (a) and m Π (1) = 1 − lim a↑1 Π (a). Introduce the set D Π as follows
where the integral above is the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral and
(4)
Note that we can associate with Π by using the notation Π . The last representation above is a Choquet integral representation of the risk measure. In the literature, g is known as the distortion function. Popular examples are Value at Risk with Π VaRα (t) = 1 [α,1] (t) and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), also known as expected
Remark 2. A distortion risk measure has two important properties. First, it is positive homogenous of degree one i.e., (λX) = λ (X) , for every λ > 0 and X ∈ L 0 and second, it is cash invariant i.e., (X + c) = (X) + c, for every c ∈ R and X ∈ L 0 . This two properties indicate that for any random variable X, (X) is in terms of the time T value.
In the literature of actuarial science, the same definition is used for risk premiums. However, since we are using a specific model for the dynamics of assets, and also since we have to find the market value of an insurance contract, we cannot use an arbitrary risk premium function. In other words, we have to derive the premium law. We will show that in our problem, by ruling out the risk of moral hazard, the premium law has the same representation as a distortion risk premium. So we make the following assumption: Assumption 1 . We assume there is no risk of moral hazard; that means, both bank and insurance fell risk of an adverse event. For that, we assume that both the bank and insurance loss variables are non-decreasing functions of the global loss variable. This assumption rules out the risk of moral hazard, as both sides have to feel any increase in the global loss (see for example Heimer (1989) and Bernard and Tian (2009) ). Therefore we assume that I = f (L) where both f and id − f are non-decreasing (here id denotes the identity function). It is easy to check that in that case f and id − f are Lipschitz functions. It is known that every Lipschitz continuous function f is almost everywhere differentiable and its derivative is essentially bounded by its Lipschitz constant. Furthermore, f can be written as the integral of its derivative denoted by h, i.e., f (x) =´x 0 h(t)dt. Therefore, we introduce the set C of the contracts as
Note that C can also be characterize as follows
For any indemnification function f =´x 0 h (t) dt, h is called the marginal indemnification function (MIF). The interpretation of the marginal indemnification function is as follows: if f (x) =´x 0 h(t)dt is in C, then at each loss value L = x, a marginal change δ to the value of the total risk will result in marginal change of the size δh(x) in the allocation of risk. In what follows, we observe that this marginal change is either 0 or δ, i.e., h = 0 or 1. This means that for any small change in the total risk, there is only one agent (either bank or the insurer) who has to bear the changes in the risk.
Now we want to introduce the risk premium. An important implication of Assumption 1 is that all insurance contracts are in the form of a contingent claim i.e.,
To find the market value of a contingent claim we use the no-arbitrage valuation. Using Girsanov theorem, it is known that if the market is complete, the unique martingale measure Q has the density
where m = µ − r. Therefore, we can introduce the premium as π (I) = e −rT E (ϕ m I) .
We apply following relation between ϕ m and the price process of the stock, cf. Nakano (2004) :
It is then easily seen that ϕ m is a decreasing function of S T . Now we want to state a very important proposition that can present the premium as a distortion risk measure. Howeve, in order to prove this we need the Hardy-Littlewood theorem. For a proof one can see Theorem 2.76 in Föllmer and Schied (2004) .
Theorem 1. (Hardy-Littlewood). Let X and Y in L 0 be two non-negative random variables such that |E(XY )| < ∞. Then, Let us introduce the following notation π (I) := E ϕ |m| I .
Proposition 1. The following equaity holds
Proof. In order to prove the propositions claim we consider two cases:
Case 1: m ≥ 0. In this case ϕ m and I are both decreasing functions of the underlying asset S T . Therefore, by Hardy-Littlewood's inequality one can get that
where Ππ(x) =´x 0 VaR t (ϕ m )dt. On the other hand, for x > 0 we have
where N denoted the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable with mean zero and variance one. Therefore, we have
Given this, one can further show that
which clearly gives a distortion function associated with a Wang's premium (indeed, π is a Wang premium, see Wang (2000)).
Case 2: m < 0. In this case while still I is a decreasing function of S T , ϕ m is an increasing function of S T . Therefore, by Hardy-Littlewood's inequality one can get that
Given that N −1 (t) = −N −1 (t), similar to what we have derived above we get
Remark 3. Usually in practice, m ≥ 0 but, m < 0 can mathemaically happen. However, give the last proposition one can easily see that the pricing rule is invariant with respect to the sign of m. In the continuation we always consider the usual case m ≥ 0, but all the following results can be derived similarly for m < 0 .
Going back to the bank problem, since is cash invariant, (1) can be re-written as
Before ending this section let us introduce the following notations for any random variable X and risk measure Φ (t) := 1 − Π (t) and Φ X (t) := Φ (F X (t)) .
Similar notation will be used to introduce Φπand Φπ X . Now we can obtain Φπ L . First note that in general
Then, we have
and from this we get
For instance, for L = L n we get
Optimal Solutions
First, we need a technical assumption which is used in the sequel.
Assumption 2. We assume that any distortion measure satisfies the following regularity condition lim n→∞ (X ∧ n) = (X).
It is worth mentioning that the Wang's premium (8) has this property. Let us introduce the following notation
Here (x) + = max {x, 0}. Now, we can state the main theorem of this paper Theorem 2. If assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and if m ≥ 0, the optimal solution to (9) is given by
Proof. First, we assume that L is bounded. Given Assumption 1, let I = f (L) be a contract where f ∈ C. Therefore we can rewrite the optimal problem (9) as,
(13)
Since g := id − f is also non-decreasing, and since VaR t commutes with monotone functions, we get
Similarly, since f is non-decreasing we haveπ(f (L)) =´1 0 f (VaR t (L))dΠπ(t). Now, assume that f (x) =´x 0 h(t)dt, for a function 0 ≤ h ≤ 1. Given that L is bounded, by Fubini's theorem we can interchange the order of integrals to get
Therefore, problem (13) can be written as
Then, problem (16) can again be rewritten as
For the rest of the proof, we need to use the theory of Lagrangian duality on Banach spaces; for further information one can see Luenberger (1969) , Chapter 8. Problem (17) can be considered in the space of all bounded functions on R + equipped with the sup norm denoted by L ∞ (R + ). Let θ ≥ 0 be a Lagrangian multiplier, then the dual problem is
where (x) − = max {−x, 0}. Observe that since h ≡ > 0, for small enough, is in the interior of the feasibility set, the Slater's condition is satisfied. This implies the strong duality holds and as a result the following minmax problem has a solution min θ≥0 max 0≤h≤1 λ(θ, h) = max 0≤h≤1 min θ≥0 λ(θ, h).
Let us denote the solution to this problem by (θ * , h * ). We have two cases : First, assume θ * > 0. In this case the following complement slackness condition
implies that the primal constraint is active i.e.,´∞ 0 (Φπ L (t) − Φ L (t)) h(t)dt = B. Therefore, h * can be found by solving the following problem
Therefore, the solution to this problem can be given as follows
Second, assume θ * = 0. In this case, the complement slackness condition and the dual feasibility hold, therefore the solution is given by h * (t) = 0.
This completes the proof for bounded L.
Now we assume the general case, when L is unbounded. Consider the mapping X → 1 0 VaR t (X) dΠ (t) for a distortion function Π, as a general representation of distortion risk measures and premiums. It is clear that at each point t, {Π • F X∧n (t)} n=1,2,... , is non-increasing in n. On the other hand, for any t, there exist n t such that if n > n t then F X∧n (t) = F X (t). Therefore, for any t, we have Π(F X∧n (t)) ↓ Π(F X (t)). Now by Monotone Convergence Theorem for any function 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, we have that
Using this fact, our continuity assumption (12), and that f (x) =´x 0 h (t) dt is nondecreasing, we havê
The rest of the proof is the same as what follows after (15).
The following corollary is very helpful in the continuation.
Corollary 1. If in addition to assumptions 1, 2 and m ≥ 0, the following condition holds
then the optimal solution to problem (9) is given by
Proof. According to Theorem 2, one can write the solution as
First, observe that if esssup (L) = ∞, the result is clear. Now let us assume that esssup (L) = a < ∞. In that case we have L ≤ a. If Φπ L = θ * 1+θ * Φ L is of Lebesgue measure zero then again the result is clear. Now, let us assume that this set is not of measure zero. It is clear that the equality Φπ L (t) = θ * 1+θ * Φ L (t) holds only if t ≥ a; in which case F L (t) = 1. Therefore we get that Φπ L (t) = Φ L (t) = 0 on Φπ L = θ * 1+θ * Φ L . Now we claim h * 1 = 1 {Φπ L < θ * 1+θ * Φ L } is an optimal solution. First of all, observe that h * 1 ≤ h 1 , meaning that it does not increase the minimum in (17). On the other hand, we have to check the constraint. Indeed, since Φπ L (t) = Φ L (t) = 0, we havê
This completes the proof .
Remark 4. The non-zero Lebesgue measurable set Φπ L = θ * 1+θ * Φ L appears in many cases. For instance, for the loss function L n , one can see that L n (S T ) ≤ e rT S 0 , which means F L (t) = 1 for t ≥ e rT S 0 . This implies Φπ L (t) = θ * 1+θ * Φ L (t) = 0, for t ≥ e rT S 0 . The following corollary shows that the conditions for Corollary 1 for important cases are satisfied.
Corollary 2. If = VaR α or = CVaR α , and if L = L n and m ≥ 0 then the conditions of the Corollary 1 are satisfied.
Proof. First of all observe that F Ln is absolutely increasing on 0, e rT S 0 = esssup (L n ) . On the other hand, as we visualize bellow, it is cleat that for any number 0 ≤ θ, the set Φπ = θ 1+θ Φ is of measure zero for = VaR α or = CVaR α . Indeed one needs to know that Φ for = VaR α or = CVaR α are piecewise linear while Φπ is strictly concave. The implication of these discussions is that
Designing the Optimal Contracts for Value at Risk and Conditional Value at Risk
In this section, we prove that the optimal deposit insurances, when the risk measure is either VaR α or CVaR α , are two-layer policies. That is why we first obtain an explicit solution to the two-layer contracts. First of all, as a two-layer policy we mean a contract in the following form
where f is defined as
for upper and lower retention levels u and l, respectively.
To have a complete recipe for finding an optimal insurance contract we need to know four elements: i) a representation of the contract in terms of lower and upper retention levels ii) the values VaR α (L) CVaR α (L) iii) the priceπ (D (S T )) for a non-increasing function D iv) the value of upper and lower retention levels. In what follows we discuss these elements through three propositions and two theorems.
Proposition 2. A general form of the stop-loss policy with retention levels u and l is given by
Proof. Let u 0 = L −1 (u) and l 0 = L −1 (l). Then (18) Therefore,
Corollary 3. In particular, if we consider the loss function (2), the policy I can be represented as
Proof. Easily we have
For CVaR α , we just need to apply its definition.
To find the value of l the following proposition is very useful.
Proposition 4. Let D : R → R be a non-increasing function, then
Proof. According to (7),
Now we prove that for particular risk measures VaR α or CVaR α the optimal deposit insurances are indeed stop-loss policies. Let us start with VaR. 
Remark 5. In contrast with Merton (1977) , where it is assumed that an insurance contract is a put option, our assumptions lead to the contracts that are bounded from above.
Proof. In this case we have Π (t) = 1 [α,1] (t) and therefore
First of all, according to Corollary 2, I = f * (L) is an optimal contract where f * (x) = 
for any θ is an interval. Indeed, we have
. This relation shows that first, the policy is a two-layer policy, second the upper retention level of the policy is u = VaR α (L) (see Remark 1) and third that θ * > 0. Since θ * > 0, we have to check the following condition for optimality by Theorem 2
which after substituting from (20) we get
Note that for any general random variable X and a number a we have
Therefore, if we plug this in (21) (1 − Π VaRα (x)) for two different values of θ. If θ 1+θ is greater that γ the lower retention is denoted by l 0 and the upper retention is equal to α. If θ 1+θ is less that γ the two graphs do not intersect.
Note that the upper retention level is easily equal to u = VaR α (L), and can be found using Proposition 3. On the other hand, to find the lower retention level, we have to solve (19) . In order to do that we need to apply Proposition 4. We define D l (y) = min {L (y) − l, 0} and
Then, we find solution toπ (D l (S T )) + b =π (D (S T )). One can numerically find π (D l (S T )) andπ (D (S T )) as follows:
Next we will have the same discussions for CVaR α .
Theorem 4. If = CVaR α , m ≥ 0 and the assumptions of Corollary 1 hold, then the optimal solution is either h * = 0 or it is a stop-loss policy with upper and lower retention level u and l satisfying the following system of equations
and Φπ (l) 1 − F L (u) 1 − α = Φπ (F L (u)) .
Proof. In this case, we have Φ (t) = 1 [0,α) (t) + 1−t 1−α 1 [α,1] (t). Note that for θ ≥ 0 Φπ L (t) + θ (Φπ L (t) − Φ L (t)) = (1 + θ) Φπ L (t) − θΦ L (t) .
First of all, according to Corollary 2, I = f * (L) is an optimal contract where f * (x) =´x 0 h * (t) dt and h * = 1 {Φπ L +θ * (Φπ L −Φ L )<0} is a solution. Now we show {Φπ L + θ * (Φπ L − Φ L ) < 0} is an interval. If we let γ = Φπ (α), one can distinguish two different cases. First, θ * 1+θ * ≤ γ, for which, Φπ L (t) > θ * 1+θ * Φ L (t), and therefore, the optimal solution is h * = 0. Second, θ * 1+θ * > γ, where in this case Φπ L (l) = θ * 1+θ * and u 0 < 1 is the unique solution to θ * 1+θ * 1−F L (u) 1−α = Φπ (F L (u)). If we replace θ * 1+θ * from the former into the latter we get Φπ L (l) 1 − F L (u) 1 − α = Φπ (F L (u)) .
On the other hand, we have In order to find the upper and lower levels based on solving the system of equations (22) and (23), we need to use Propositions 3 and 4. The only quantities we need to know, further to what we have discussed for VaR α , isπ (D u (S T )), where D u (y) = min {L (y) , u}, and the following values (from (10) and (11) (1 − Π CVaRα (x)) for two different values of θ. If θ 1+θ is greater that γ the lower retention is denoted by l 0 and the upper retention by u 0 . If θ 1+θ is less that γ the two graphs do not intersect.
Concluding remarks
A deposit insurance contract is designed that does not produce the risk of moral hazard. In a complete market framework, we considered a bank that seeks an optimal insurance policy to keep the bank position solvent. We characterized optimal insurance contracts in a general framework when the bank uses a distortion risk measure to meet the solvency requirements. In particular we have seen that if one uses VaR α and CVaR α , the optimal policies are stop-loss policies.
